国际组织语言政策与规划的特点：以东盟为例

Characterising language policy and planning in international organisations: ASEAN insights

国际组织语言政策与规划的特点：以东盟为例

Huan Yik Lee, M. Obaidul Hamid & Ian Hardy

作者简介

Huan Yik Lee（吕焕钰），澳大利亚昆士兰大学教育学院博士研究生。主要研究方向为语言政策与规划、语言教育政策、语言意识形态、语言政治、语言社会学和多语。

M. Obaidul Hamid是澳大利亚昆士兰大学教育学院高级讲师。他发表了大量有关TESOL教育政策与实践，英语作为亚洲教学媒介语(EMI)，以及英语在个体流动和社会发展中的作用的论文。

Ian Hardy 是澳大利亚昆士兰大学教育学院副教授。他在教育政策与政治领域发表了大量文章，也逐渐关注和参与与国际教育和比较教育有关的政策研究。

ABSTRACT

Although most international organisations are, in principle, multilingual, the ten-member Association of South East  Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted a radical approach by operating monolingually, ostensibly for convenience and  pragmatism.  In  order to provide an evaluation of the ASEAN policy context, this paper compares and contrasts ASEAN to two other more familiar international organisations, namely the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). The paper attempts to rationalise language policy and planning (LPP) in these organisations, grounded in principles such as equality, inclusivity, practicality, instrumentality, economic viability and even  arguably,  ‘neutrality’  in  the  context of ASEAN. These principles are discussed in relation to two underlying models of language ideology,  i.e.  linguistic  pluralism  and internationalisation, which characterise ASEAN,  EU  and  UN  LPP. The article presents the argument that ASEAN has embraced English-only monolingualism, rooted in internationalisation, while both UN and EU strive to achieve plurilingualism, albeit through divergent multilingual operational models. The analysis, however, shows that the ideology of linguistic pluralism  characterising  UN  and EU is at best symbolic, as this ideology has practically  maintained the hegemony of English and, to  some  extent,  the  other languages of power.  This  suggests  that  ASEAN  may  not  have much to learn from EU or UN for an alternative to its English-only policy.

KEYWORDS

Language policy and planning in international organisations; ASEAN; European Union; United Nations; language ideology; 

摘要

虽然大多数国际组织原则上实行多语制，但由十个成员国组成的东南亚国家联盟，简称东盟(ASEAN)，却看似为了方便和实用而实行一种激进的单语制。为了对东盟政策环境进行评估，本文将东盟与另外两个更为大众熟悉的国际组织联合国（UN）和欧盟（EU）进行了比较和对比。本文试图依据平等性、包容性、实用性、工具性、经济可行性，乃至东盟环境下的中立性原则，使这些组织的语言政策和规划(LPP) 合理化。这些原则与语言意识形态的两种潜在模式，即语言多元化和国际化有关，这二者也是东盟、欧盟和联合国LPP的特点。本文认为东盟受国际化影响，接受唯英语的单语制，尽管联合国和欧盟采取不同的多语言运作模式，但他们均致力于实现多语。然而，分析表明，联合国和欧盟的语言多元化意识形态特征仅具有象征意义，因为这种意识形态实际上维持了英语的霸权，并在一定程度上维持了其他语言的霸权。这表明，东盟可能不太需要向欧盟或联合国学习以改变其唯英语政策。

关键词

国际组织语言政策与规划；东盟；欧盟；联合国；语言意识形态；多语政策

Language is not a simple tool … but very often the very essence of the diplo matic vocation. (Nick, 2001, p. 39)

For an international organisation consisting of member-states with various language backgrounds, the question of language(s) is of utmost significance for intra-organisational and external communication (Okudaira, 1999). However, language choice is a contentious issue in such settings. For many, language is not only a pragmatic tool for diplomacy (Kawashima, 2021) but, more importantly, a vehicle for symbolic  soft  power (Crystal, 1997). The underlying language ideologies of these organisations are typically connected with elevating the status and valorisation of certain lingua francas, asserting ‘soft power’ of associated member-states, or projecting an image of linguistic equality and international solidarity. In view of these ideologies, international organisations often consider language choices within their linguistic ecology, taking into account the official or national languages of member-states. This enables  member- states to engage in international discourse and access a shared economic market. The United Nations (UN), for example, through provisions in the General Assembly, Security Council and Economic and Social Council, has acknowledged six official languages com- prising English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Arabic and French (Finsen, 2016). The European Union (EU), meanwhile, has opted for a plurilingual policy, in line with its motto of ‘Unity in Diversity.’ EU, with 27 member-states, recognises 24 official languages, of which three (English, French and German) have the higher status of ‘procedural’ languages. Although most international organisations are, in principle, multilingual (Finsen, 2016), there are a few such organisations which operate monolingually, ostensibly for convenience and pragmatism. The ten-member Association of South  East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one such organisation and its English-only monolingual policy is the subject of the present analysis.

Since its foundation in 1967, ASEAN has built a unique mode of international communication. Without any stipulation as an official language, English played a practical role as the de-facto working language. In 2009, English was formally established as ASEAN’s de jure language of administration in the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). Given the dominant role of English as a global lingua franca and its role as a de-facto official and working language in most international organisations (Finsen, 2016), it is perhaps unsurprising for ASEAN to use English. Hardini and Grangé (2017), however, highlighted the uniqueness of this language policy decision, as the organisation consists of heterogeneous member-states in political, economic, cultural and sociolinguistic terms. What is interesting is that ASEAN is arguably one of the few international organ- isations taking a radical approach, in which an exogenous language is chosen as the only working language.

Scholars have delved into language policy and planning (LPP) of international organ- isations, notably UN (McEntee-Atalianis, 2017; McEntee-Atalianis & Vessey, 2020) and EU (Ammon, 2006; Grin, 2006; Johnson, 2013). However, there has been limited research on ASEAN LPP (Hardini & Grangé, 2017; Kirkpatrick, 2010). This article attempts to examine ASEAN’s LPP and its underlying language ideologies and principles. In order to provide an evaluation of the ASEAN policy context, the examination will refer to two other more familiar international organisations – the UN and EU. This comparative approach may highlight the uniqueness of the ASEAN LPP and its purportedly radical departure from LPP norms for intergovernmental organisations.

Compared to the UN and even more-so, the EU, the ASEAN English-only LPP may invite negative assessment from critical scholars. However, our analysis seeks to illustrate that this supposed negative planning may possibly reflect the ASEAN approach to LPP, which is fundamentally underpinned by the principles of not only equality and inclusivity, but also neutrality, instrumentality, practicality as well as economic viability. More- over, the ASEAN–UN–EU comparative analysis shows that the ideology of linguistic pluralism characterising UN and EU is at best symbolic, as this ideology has practically maintained the hegemony of English and, to some extent, the other languages of power. The ASEAN ideology of English seems somewhat direct and undiplomatic, while that of UN and EU can be considered more diplomatic. Nevertheless, there may not be significant differences in actual LPP outcomes for these key international organisations. Considering these LPP processes and outcomes, ASEAN policymakers may have little interest in taking EU in particular and its linguistic pluralism as a model for LPP.

01

Language planning in international organisations

What languages should international organisations choose for their functioning? Inter- governmental organisations need to balance inclusivity and equality on the one hand,  and practicality, instrumentality and economic viability on the other (Finsen, 2016; McEntee-Atalianis & Vessey, 2020). The deliberation over these principles often leads to mostly multilingual policies reflective of linguistic and cultural diversity.  The  African Union, for example, has included a number of working languages, namely Swahili, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese as well as African languages. With 55 member-states to date, the Union’s inclusive policy stipulates African languages as official languages and has ensured equality of status, equal rights and privileges in   their use in all institutions of the Pan-African Parliament and the African Union. Simi- larly, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has three members comprising the United States, Canada and Mexico, recognises the official use of  English, French and Spanish, although, as Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) specu- late, the purported ‘equality’ among English, French and Spanish likely remains a fiction. A more explicit multilingual approach can be noted in the five-member organisation of the Nordic Council, which specifies three official languages, namely Danish, Swedish and Norwegian. The Council also encourages the learning of neighbouring languages. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which comprises 57 member-states, mean- while lists three official languages, consisting of English, French and Arabic in the OIC Charter (Article 38) to ease communication barriers and promote cooperation among  member-states. Finally, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (with 37 member-states) operates bilingually in English and French.

As opposed to the afore-mentioned international/regional organisations, which operate multilingually, there are several organisations, which have adopted monolingual policies. These organisations usually operate using one ‘working language’ which is typically a former colonial language (often English or French) or a lingua franca of the region, e.g. Arabic. These organisations usually share common historical, geographical, cultural and linguistic legacies. Therefore, the selection, and thereafter acceptance, of a ‘common (second) language’ as a working language may be widely  understood  in most, if not all, member-states. Examples include the Council of  Arab  Economic  Unity and Arab League, with 22 member-states in each, both enlisting Arabic as their official working language. Although the member-states are not from the same continent/region, Arabic is spoken in each country. Another example is the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth Secretariat), which is principally an assembly of nations, which have had prior history of British colonialism or were former British protectorates. English is the official language of the Commonwealth and functions as a lingua franca. Lastly, West African Economic and Monetary Union, which is essentially a trade bloc, recognises French as the only official language. Its eight member-states are situated within the same geographical region, as well as sharing common colonial histories as Francophone countries.

ASEAN falls into the second category of organisations with a single official language, although it is demographically far more complex than some of the groupings mentioned above. Southeast Asia is not only a region with a colourful past, but is also a cultural melting pot with more than 1200 living languages (Eberhard et al., 2020). The region had experienced British, American, French, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and Japanese occupation since the sixteenth century, before entering a post-independence period in  the twentieth century. Thailand is the only country that has not officially been ‘colonised.’ To some extent, the continuation of postcolonial undertones of ASEAN language regime is not entirely unexpected. English had long been used as a linguistic tool of the colonial powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Ostler, 2010). The role of English has been further cemented in the twenty-first century as English continues to play a dominant role in international diplomacy. English, perceived as a language of convenience and development (Crystal, 1997), reinforces its role in intergovernmental organisations, so much so that ASEAN may have turned into an English-only organisation, primarily justified by the principles of instrumentality and practicality. If there is one organisation that is most similar to ASEAN in terms of using English as the sole working language, it is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which aims to promote trade and invest- ment in the Pacific Basin. APEC comprises ten member-states of ASEAN plus eleven members-states from within Asia-Pacific. APEC appears to have borrowed substantially from ASEAN’s policy approach, including the ASEAN Way (Acharya, 1997) in decision- making. However, APEC, which predominantly emphasises business and trade negotiations, is not comparable to a politically, socially, economically and culturally significant institution such as ASEAN (Chesterman, 2010).

02

Ideologies of LPP in international organisations

Drawing on the ‘ideologies of language planning’ (Cobarrubias, 1983), this paper examines common principles undergirding LPP in intergovernmental organisations.  Although Cobrarrubias’s language ideologies are meant to be applied in analysing national contexts, these can be equally helpful in characterising LPP in international organisations. Cobarrubias (1983) describes four key ideologies of language planning: linguistic assimilation, linguistic pluralism, vernacularisation and internationalisation. Two of these ideologies are particularly salient for the argument presented  in  this paper. The first is linguistic pluralism, which recognises more than one language, as in the case of South Africa (eleven official languages), Switzerland (four),  Singapore (four) and Cameroon (two). In terms of intergovernmental organisations, the UN and EU appear to be driven by linguistic pluralism. Tsuda (2000) argues that an ecological perspective, which pursues equality among languages and preservation of different languages, is necessary to establish equality in communication and linguistic human rights, in tandem with ‘linguistic pluralism.’

The second ideology, internationalisation, involves the use of a non-indigenous language for wider communication, business and international trade, as in the case of many African countries relying on English, French or Portuguese for these functions (Mansour, 1993). Informed by the ‘internationalisation’ ideology, ASEAN’s adoption  of English as the regional lingua franca is often euphemised as the ‘ASEAN Way’ of taming the Babel in a multilingual and multicultural region (see also Okudaira, 1999: ‘ASEAN-ness’). ASEAN’s subscription to ‘internationalisation’ is in stark contrast to the other two organisations – the UN and the EU – which favour linguistic pluralism in managing their linguistic and cultural diversity. What makes the ASEAN LPP case dis- tinctive is the element of supposed ‘neutrality’ as one of its guiding principles which may have led to ASEAN choosing a linguistic path which is different from the majority of intergovernmental organisations.

03

Understanding LPP in international organisations: ASEAN insights

To provide a contextual understanding of the ASEAN LPP, the comparative analysis in this paper is based on six guiding principles informing LPP in this setting, including in relation to the EU and UN; these are inclusivity and equality, pragmatism (instrumentality) and practicality, economic viability, (see also Finsen, 2016; McEntee-Atalianis & Vessey, 2020) and, specifically in the context of ASEAN, neutrality. With regard to Cobarrubias’ models of linguistic ideologies, the guiding principles of inclusivity and equality are presumably encapsulated in linguistic pluralism, while pragmatism and practicality are in essence linked to the ideology of internationalisation. When considering economic viability of LPP in international organisations, the associated ideologies tend to pivot towards internationalisation as well as ‘restrictive’ linguistic pluralism (see Economic Viability, below). This paper further argues that neutrality is a hitherto less-men- tioned and nuanced principle of LPP in international organisations, which may not necessarily be a distinctive feature of either ideologies. For EU, neutrality might be subsumed under linguistic pluralism but in the case of ASEAN, it leans towards internatio- nalisation. These principles will be discussed together with the two underlying models of language ideology, i.e. linguistic pluralism and internationalisation as these relate to ASEAN, EU and UN LPP. This comparative analysis sheds necessary light on the nature of each of these bodies, but particularly in relation to the ASEAN grouping, the principal focus of this article.

Equality and inclusivity

ASEAN formalised the role of English as the working language in Article 34 of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009) with the tacit agreement of all ten member-states. English, an exogenous language, was chosen firstly as a de facto  working language by the initial five founding members of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. The inclusion of the other five members – Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and, finally, Cambodia (1999) –reaffirmed English as ASEAN’s sole working language. This language choice needs to be analysed in relation to the ASEAN’s vision as an organisation: ‘The ASEAN socio-cultural Community 2025 vision is for an ASEAN Community that engages and benefits the peoples and is inclusive, sustainable, resilient, and dynamic’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015, p.3). Notwithstanding the aspiration of an ‘inclusive’ ASEAN Community, ASEAN’s socio-cultural community vision apparently contradicts its monolingual language provision, which is often deemed ‘exclusive.’ Paradoxically, ASEAN adopted ‘exclusive’ LPP in order to be seen as ‘inclusive’ and ‘equitable’ for all member-states. ASEAN has taken what can be called ‘a minimalist approach’ to LPP, which determines the external language as the sole working language. By excluding all languages of the region from its planning scope, it sought to avoid potential linguistic conflicts (Kawashima, 2021). One of the underlying principles of ASEAN is that all member-states are treated equally. This is achieved by ‘null planning’ or by not according status to any of the national languages. It should be noted that ASEAN does not aim for linguistic ‘assimilation’ (Cobarrubias, 1983), as it does not overtly coerce members in the use or the learning of English in respective member-states. ASEAN’s minimalist approach considers English only at the organisational-level, allowing member-states to have full sovereignty in national and educational language policy matters, as per the objectives of the organisation. In other words, ASEAN LPP concerns only the regional, organisation-level of operations, beyond the national. As McEntee-Atalianis and Vessey (2020, p. 568) claim, there is a tendency to ‘de-prioritise language issues in relation to other national and international affairs’ in organisational LPP. Although ASEAN’s monolingual provision is debatable, ASEAN is determined to show that the ASEAN Way of LPP, which means ‘planning small’ and strictly adhering to non-interference in local affairs, is effective (Koh et al., 2009).

In ASEAN’s case, historical experiences and interactions with global powers have generally contributed to a view of ‘diversity’ being a source of ‘vulnerability’ (Ba, 2009). ASEAN opted for English in the full knowledge that Southern multilingualism has had  a long history in the Global South (Heugh & Stroud, 2019). Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter lists, as one of its principles, ‘respect for the different languages of the peoples of ASEAN.’ In principle, ASEAN respects linguistic and cultural diversity as well as acknowledges the pivotal role of national languages. However, there is no provision   for a regional language or language education policy through which this respect for different languages might be realised (Kirkpatrick, 2010). For a better understanding between peoples and for political and economic success of the ASEAN community, Hardini and Grangé (2017) proposed ideas for the promotion of ASEAN languages among member-states. In reality,  however, the education systems in  Southeast Asia   are not geared towards preparing learners with knowledge of neighbouring regional languages (Kirkpatrick, 2010). Signs of integrative or humanistic motivations are  absent, despite the inclusion of Article 2 in the ASEAN Charter. Article 2 remains rhetorical and does not translate into an appreciation of regional linguistic and cultural diversity. Without additional clauses on languages in ASEAN Sociocultural Community Blueprint (2015–2025) to reflect the multilingual and multicultural identity of ASEAN, there appears to be no political commitment towards promoting language development, be it local, regional or foreign languages.

In direct contrast to ASEAN, EU advocates ‘unity in diversity’ by including as many as 24 languages, although some, e.g. Estonian, Irish and Maltese, are less commonly used in most parts of Europe. Whether by design or predicament, linguistic diversity is one of EU’s hallmarks, thus it makes language policy unavoidable since managing linguistic diversity is and will remain a challenge (Kruse & Ammon, 2018). Historically, there is no commonly accepted lingua franca between the states in Europe; each official language of the countries composing the EU is therefore recognised, whatever the number of its speakers, all in the name of the principle of equality between languages and cultures (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). From the outset, EU subscribed to linguistic pluralism at  least  in  policy  terms.  EU respects  linguistic  diversity  (Article  22)  and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of language (Article 21), as enshrined in the EU Charter, and in the Treaty on European Union (Article 3(3)). In advocating support for linguistic pluralism, a study commission by the European Parliament (2016, p. 8) found that,

Multilingualism is the most effective language regime  to convey informationto EU citizens. The percentage   of people who would be excluded if Englishwere the only official language of the EU ranges from 45% to   80% dependingon the indicator and dataset used. A  trilingual policy based on English,French and  German would exclude 26% to 50% of adult residents  in the EU.The percentage of excluded people would  be very high in Southernand Eastern Europe.

In policy terms, EU’s language policy appears democratic as well as idealistic. However, as Ammon (2012) reports, the recognition of 24 official languages can be considered cosmetic work serving symbolic purposes of European unity in diversity. Power imbalance and linguistic inequality in (un)recognised official languages undoubtedly still exist. In practice, not all languages are treated as equals; some are arguably more equal than others, i.e. English, French and German (as noted in the next section).

Politically speaking, EU provisions on language policy and language rights are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights included in the Lisbon Treaty (Phillipson, 2008). Whilst the principles of inclusivity and equality may contribute to democratic policymaking in intergovernmental organisations, EU has had to address tensions arising from language-related questions. To illustrate the tensions arising from LPP processes, Germany took a stand to boycott one of the EU ministerial meetings at a time when Finland, which was holding the Presidency, decided to provide interpretations only in English, French and Finnish (Forsberg, 2000).  The rationale behind the boycott was  that German was and still is the language spoken by at least 25% of the EU citizens,  thus their language rights should not be compromised. Moreover, Germany is regarded as an influential European economy. The ‘language dispute’ led to some calling for languages to be treated equally, not only in policy discourse but also in practice (Gazzola, 2016; Kruse & Ammon, 2018).

In 1995, there was a proposal from the French officials to reduce the number of working languages in the European Commission; but other member-states countered promptly, resulting in no action being taken (European Parliament, 2002).  In  this  sense, the proposal was perceived as a violation of the basic treaties of the EU, which articulate clearly the equality of all languages. From an  historical  perspective,  the major linguistic communities (German, French, Spanish and Italian) are concerned about the ‘linguistic imperialism’ of another language (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). If ASEAN’s mantra in LPP appears to be a ‘less is more,’ or a ‘touch and go’ approach, EU’s model is underpinned by an ideology of ‘more is more,’ and a ‘maximalist approach’ that is far more complicated in practice. In exercising EU’s commitment to protecting multilingualism as the symbol of continued cultural autonomy of the member-states, there are often struggles between the need to balance identity of EU member-states    and the efficiency of EU-wide communication (Kruse & Ammon, 2018). For EU, there is a sense that identity of member-states that is reflected in its plurilingual (multilingual protection measures) provisions is idealistic, but in reality, there are issues regarding operational efficiency and convenience. ASEAN chooses to prioritise operational efficiency and convenience, and limits discussion in relation to plurilingual provision, particularly at the ASEAN-level, on the pretext of preserving harmony among the member-states  and national sovereignty of respective governments. A closer analysis  of UN’s LPP may provide a better understanding of the principles and underlying ideologies in relation to ASEAN and EU.

The largest intergovernmental organisation in the world is the United Nations. With the main goals of inclusivity and equality, UN’s multilingual policy is premised on its organisational goals to ensure increased participation of member-states, as well as greater effectiveness, better outcomes and wider involvement (Finsen, 2016). Multilingu- alism enables communication between the UN’s linguistically and culturally diverse member-states within the meeting rooms and halls of the UN. However, UN’s linguistic pluralism is fundamentally distinct from the ‘idealistic’ linguistic pluralism of EU. From ideological perspectives, UN’s model of linguistic pluralism can be described as a ‘realist’ variant. With 193 recognised member-states, there are ‘only’ six official and working languages of UN comprising Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish,   all of which are regarded as the most influential languages in the Global Language System (De Swaan, 2001). Under Rule 51 of the UN General Assembly, these languages:

… shall be both the official and the working languages of the GeneralAssembly Rules of Procedure, its committees and its subcommittees.

The rationale for selecting six official languages embodies the symbolic vitality of these languages, which serve as lingua francas in various parts of the world, but more importantly, for their geopolitical influence globally. As Ng and Deng (2017) postulated, language ‘reveals’ and ‘reflects power,’ as well as ‘maintains existing dominance.’ The six languages, in essence, represent ‘hard power’ (politics, economics and military) as well as ‘soft power’ (culture, aesthetics and history) tied with language and polities (Crystal, 1997). UN’s approach towards inclusivity includes the major languages,  which, inadvertently, privileges the six official languages as powerful languages of the world (Finsen, 2016). Several languages with a substantial number of speakers around the world are, however, excluded, for example, Hindi, Bangla, Afrikaans and Indone- sian/Malay. A corpus linguistic investigation of UN’s General Debates sheds light on per- sistent attempts in recent years for recognition of Portuguese (since 1976) and Bangla (since 2009) as official/working languages (McEntee-Atalianis & Vessey, 2020). However, the lack of policy change (‘inertia’) could be attributed  to  ‘lower power status of these member-states’ (McEntee-Atalianis & Vessey, 2020, p. 567). Kawashima (2021) rightly claimed that UN’s LPP, although multilingual in nature, is more ‘restric- tive’ compared to the EU ‘non-restrictive’ language provision.

From another perspective, the UN approach to ‘linguistic pluralism’  is more realistic and pragmatic. As opposed to the EU LPP, it is less likely a case of ‘attempted idealism.’ Having as many languages as possible as official languages is idealistic in the case of EU, but it is impractical and poses a potential nightmare for translators and interpreters (see issues of translation in section on Economic viability below). Currently, operating with six languages is already viewed as a mammoth task for UN, as the organisation has faced challenges in budget and workload, contributing to reduced multilingual use (McEntee-Atalianis, 2017). Having said that, the UN Secretary-General has  appointed  a Coordinator for Multilingualism (Mowbray, 2010) to  pursue  the  multilingual  agenda.  Further developments  resulted in  the  General  Assembly  adopting  resolution A/RES/69/324 in 2015, which recognised the commitment towards multilingualism in UN and stressed the need for strict observance of these  resolutions  (Kawashima,  2021). Lately, UNESCO, an entity of UN, has actively advocated for mother tongue- based multilingual education as a means to improve access to education and quality of life in line with Goal Four of the Sustainable Development Goals. While the UN itself may not be responsible for promoting plurilingualism globally, several of its ‘sub’-organ- isations, in particular, UNESCO certainly are doing so.

In the case of ASEAN, it remains unclear whether a ‘realist’ form of linguistic pluralism has ever been attempted. ASEAN’s language policies have received little attention by policymakers, (socio)linguists and other stakeholders. Informal proposals were made to include Malay and subsequently French as co-official languages (Okudaira, 1999) which could have introduced a form of ‘realist’ linguistic pluralism, mirroring UN’s underlying ideology. However, the two proposals were not even discussed (Okudaira, 1999). McEntee-Atalianis and Vessey (2020) argue that it is not only an issue of how language problems appear in organisational discourses, in fact the ‘absence of references to language problems/policy is just as important as the exploration of language problems themselves’ (pp. 549–550).

Neutrality

Apart from endeavouring to engage with universal values such as inclusivity and equality, ASEAN contemplates ‘neutrality’ as an integral feature that exemplifies its language policy, a trait that is notably absent from UN and EU language policy discourses. Even though ASEAN aims to achieve equality among its members  and respects linguistic  and cultural diversity of the region, just like the EU, the means to achieving these    goals is in stark contrast to that of EU. While EU has opted for a plurilingual model reflecting symbolic identity of the region’s diversity, ASEAN has followed a monolingual internationalisation model by choosing a purportedly ‘neutral’ language that does not belong to any nations or ethnic groups in the region. For ASEAN, adopting a ‘politically neutral’ language (Okudaira, 1999) is perceived to be fulfilling its ‘neutrality’ principle that it holds as dear, as no national or ethnic  language  is  privileged over  another. From this perspective, ASEAN LPP is seen as ‘neutral’ as all member-states need to learn an exogenous language as an additional language. It is assumed that all member- states will experience a comparable share of the ‘linguistic burden’ which may be a   way of ensuring neutrality and equality from the perspective of language ideology.

However, there are contradictions in the view of English as a ‘neutral’ language in the region. Critical scholars have argued that no language is truly neutral (Phillipson, 2008, 2018). By singling out English as the only ASEAN working language, English has ironically been ‘privileged.’ Conferral of this status to English has understandably led to English being given greater emphasis by most member-states. Also, the common perception that English is a ‘neutral’ language, which ostensibly does not give clear benefits to any particular group or country within Southeast Asia, is problematically simplistic. For example, the language decision has given an unfair advantage to several nations with wider functions of English in society and consequently a ‘built-in’ disadvantage to the rest. ASEAN member-states such as Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines were British/ American colonies, while the rest hardly had any prior exposure to English (e.g. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) (Kirkpatrick, 2010). Although Okudaira (1999) claimed that no conscious decision to choose English was made at the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, the use of English was probably tied up with postcolonial discourses since Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines had an extensive history of English usage, particularly among the elites. We argue it is important to note here that none of the five initial found- ing members were Francophone nations. The decline of colonial languages, such as French (Clayton, 2008) and Dutch in Indonesia in the following decades, could have been another contributing factor. Scholars have since maintained that  English  has  never left, but merely expanded its tentacles in the former British colonies (Pennycook, 2001). Critical sociolinguists contend that when one takes into account the history of ASEAN as an association, it becomes clear that it was supported by Anglo-American power in the post-colonial period, largely seen as a bulwark against communism (Sever- ino, 2006). English is broadly perceived as the language of democratically supported power, a particularly important motivation, given the Vietnam War and the anti-communist stance of ASEAN (Kirkpatrick, 2010). This puts the apparent ‘neutrality’ of ASEAN’s language policy into question. It is unorthodox that English, the language often associated with colonialism and imperialism (Phillipson, 2018), holds an important place in this regard.

Even if notions of ‘neutrality’ are linguistically controversial, ASEAN remained steadfast in using English and ‘only’ English as ‘the’ working language when new member- states with limited prior exposure to English joined ASEAN. This is to preserve, as per the official discourse, its ‘neutrality,’ which appears to be one of the main characteristics that defines ASEAN LPP. In this context, new ASEAN member-states had to jump on the bandwagon and start using English, to reap the economic benefits of being part of ASEAN. What is interesting is that people in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and now Myanmar, are enthusiastically learning English because English is believed to represent modernisation and advancement (Rappa & Wee, 2006). This sets forth the introduction of English into the education system, capacity building in civil service as well as the private sector workforce within new ASEAN member-states. Since French and other  languages are not included as ASEAN’s working languages, these nations are left with no choice but to keep up; otherwise, they will be left  behind  (Nguyen  &  Hamid, 2020). Overall, the voluntary adoption of English as a means  of  communication  among the ten ASEAN member-states has created a sociolinguistic situation where English plays an official role beyond its traditional Anglo-American cultural domain (Zein, 2017). The former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Le Luong Minh, proposed the use of English as an essential tool to facilitate regional socio-cultural integration (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013). Beyond the linguistic neutrality debate in the ASEAN context, scholars have also attempted to explore the potential role of the English language as part of ASEAN symbolic identity (see Lee et al., in press).

EU, on the other hand, kept increasing the number of official languages when new member-states were accepted, in the spirit of unity in diversity, factoring in the principles of inclusivity and equality. Since 2004, thirteen official languages have been added. The latest addition was Croatian in 2013. Thus, ASEAN’s case resembles an ‘internationalisa- tion’ model of language ideology, which adopts an ‘external’ and so-called ‘neutral’ language as its working language. This is opposed to the EU, which has chosen to use  all languages within Europe, none of which is considered an exogenous language. In a way, the EU approach is an implicit admission that no one language can be truly ‘neutral’ since language is inextricably entangled with its history, cultural heritage and nationalism.

Pragmatism (instrumentality) and practicality

In the process of mapping language ideologies (Ajsic & McGroaty, 2015), ASEAN’s case can be characterised as instrumental LPP which focuses on operational efficiency and communicative pragmatism (Koh et al., 2009). In fact, the three international organis- ations under discussion – UN, ASEAN and EU – have one common linguistic character- istic, which is the use of English as one of their official working languages. The reality is even when EU and UN supposedly subscribe to linguistic pluralism, several languages are still more widely used than others, in particular English (McEntee-Atalianis, forthcom- ing). This is chiefly due to the need to consider the principles of practicality, efficiency and pragmatism which have an immense impact on LPP.

From the perspective of ASEAN, perhaps English is seen as sufficient as a language of administration. Limited discussion of language in the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community Vision documents would attest that monolingualism on the basis of ‘internationalisation’ was the preferred narrative. ASEAN’s minimalist approach is also rooted in a sustained ‘monolingual habitus’ among the leaders, which gave credence to the belief that a more pragmatic monolingual ideology was the  answer  to  issues  arising from a multilingual ‘mess.’ Gogolin (2009) uses the term ‘monolingual habitus’ to describe a linguistic self-conception that can make one blind to multilingual, multicultural lifestyles. One illustration is the historic ‘one nation, one language’ ideology on the formation of nation-states which failed to recognise or tried to erase the linguistic and cultural diversity encompassed within state borders (Wright, 2016). In the context of ASEAN, the notion of economic pragmatism, arguably, supersedes ecological preservation discourses. The ‘one nation, one language’ at the national-level presumably manifests itself at the regional ASEAN-level. The intellectual and political elites of Southeast Asia spoke mostly English (Kirkpatrick, 2016). The adoption of English as the working language of ASEAN was, therefore, simpler, more efficient, and more rapid and  justified on the basis of linguistic instrumentalism (Rappa & Wee, 2006). The language policy can be seen as a ‘quick fix’ so that politicians and government officers can pool their resources to focus on other, purportedly more substantive agendas, i.e. economy, politics, international relations, security, trade and business.

With pragmatism as a core principle, ASEAN has embraced a policy of using English mainly as a utilitarian and instrumental tool. English has now been used as an established lingua franca for international and intra-national communication among people from  different national, cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds in the region (Kirkpatrick, 2016; Okudaira, 1999). Above all, ASEAN mostly uses English when dealing with exter- nal  partners,  including  Australia,  Canada,  China,   EU,   India,   Japan,   New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States of America and the United Nations Development  Programme.  Many  of  these  nations and groupings are comfortable using English. From ASEAN’s ideological perspective, the practical and convenient choice of English effectively kills two  birds  with one stone. It not only allows intra-ASEAN communication, but also facilitates international communication between ASEAN and external partners. Fifty-four years since its found- ing, English has safely sustained its monopoly and has been entrenched within ASEAN (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). The dominance of English has been observed among ASEAN leaders even at the UN General Assembly meetings. Kawashima (2021) reported that the average rate of English use for ASEAN leaders at UN meetings between 2004 and 2016 was approximately 87%. This is comparatively higher than that for EU, at 67%. The absence of conflicts of interest in language choice in this region seems to have promoted the use of English (Kawashima, 2021). ASEAN’s situation in which ‘a [language] commit- tee does not have to be involved – where all participants at an international meeting automatically use a single language, as a utilitarian measure, because it is one which they have all come to learn for separate reasons’ (Crystal, 1997, p. 12) seems something of an ‘ideal’ linguistic situation. The enthusiasm in introducing English as an additional or foreign language in most if not all ASEAN polities may be a sign that the region is relentless    in its pursuit of English for a multitude of reasons (Lee et al., in press). English as the working language of ASEAN is possibly the primary catalyst. English, for better or worse, has also been engrained in Southeast Asia’s linguistic ecology. In short, while ASEAN may not coerce its member-states to teach and learn English (see section on equality and inclusivity), the fact that ASEAN has made English the sole working language makes it imperative for the member-states to do so if they want to benefit  from not only the membership of ASEAN but also with other regional or international organisations, e.g. UN and APEC. One unintended consequence of the promotion of English language education policies in the region is that it often results in a ‘crowding out’ of the school curriculum, thus adversely impacting ecological spaces for other ASEAN/Asian languages within the curriculum (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2020). This   is in  stark contrast to  the EU, where European languages are part of the curricula,  albeit certain languages are still privileged and more widely used and/or learnt than others.

By and large, although EU promotes plurilingual policies, in practice only English, French and German are more widely used (Ammon, 2012). Of these three procedural languages, English is the most commonly used in the European Commission and Euro- pean Parliament. Language provisions in EU policy documents may be rhetorical at best, as the reality is that English is still generally preferred and more widespread than say, French, German or Spanish. This demonstrates that in an idealistic linguistic pluralism approach, such as the one adopted by EU, practicality considerations have resulted in EU favouring certain ‘procedural’ languages. In practice, EU functions ‘in a limited number of official languages, and with an even more limited number of de facto working languages’ (Mowbray, 2010, p. 98). Moreover, for the sake of fairness, EU has adopted a single working language in the European Court of Justice (French) and the European Central Bank (English) (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). European nations and citizens whose languages are not one of the procedural languages, have a greater urgency to master one of the higher status ‘procedural’ languages with instrumental value, i.e. English, French and to some extent, German. Ideologically, this is likely to be a key driver in LPP decisions made by the respective member-states.

In direct opposition to ASEAN which is largely silent on practical language education policy recommendations, the Council of Europe (2007) has recommendations that encourage the learning of mother tongue plus two other languages. In pursuing plurilingualism, the Council of Europe has, to some extent, promoted the learning of L2 and L3 in the school system, and with some success. Undeniably, this is laudable; none- theless, we caution that there are two caveats here: (i) the two other languages are not necessarily European languages; and (ii) member-states are not obliged to implement this multilingual LPP in their national curriculum. This is encapsulated in European Commission policy (2007):

The European Union’s role in this field is not to replace action by Member-states, but to support and supplement it … It is the authorities  in  Member-states  (national,  regional and local authorities) who bear the primary responsibility in implementing the new push for language learning in the light of local circumstances and policies, within overall European objectives. (p. 11)

Similar to ASEAN, EU institutions cannot interfere in the educational systems of the member-states. EU language policy has limited authority and can provide recommendations at best (Kruse & Ammon, 2018). As long as these remain recommendations   and that the role of English and its global pursuit continues unabated in line with globa- lisation, there is little chance for other languages to become as dominant as English (Phil- lipson, 2008), even in the EU. In the past two decades, English has become the most widely studied foreign language among the twenty-seven member EU states (Ricento, 2015). Across both Europe and Asia, the promotion of English language is further bol- stered by the rapid increase in English Medium of Instruction (EMI) programmes in higher education (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2020).

Although EU advocates multilingualism, lately, English has become more dominant, compared to German or French  (Ammon, 2006; McEntee-Atalianis, in press). Wodak  et al. (2012) reported that in European Parliament (EP) meetings, English accounted   for almost half of all languages used by the delegates, at 45%. The prevalence of  English usage among EU leaders in UN meetings was even higher, averaging 67% between 2004 and 2018 (Kawashima, 2021). This is staggering, since French and Spanish are also recognised as official languages of the UN. An increased use of a certain language, i.e. English, at international conferences suggests a high international standing and prestige of the language (Tonkin, 2011). Astonishingly, even with Brexit, English was still the preferred language for small group meetings, informal exchanges between European officials, and calls for projects (Blake, 2017). After Brexit, English will only have an official role in two of the smallest members of the EU, Ireland and Malta (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). Even then, the role of English in EU shows no signs  of receding; in fact, Brexit may actually give English even more influence within the EU.  As  the  major  native   speaking   member   departs,   this   may   well   make   many members of the EU parliament and EU officials feel more comfortable when    they are using English as there will be few native speakers present (Modiano, 2017). This indirectly reflects a perplexing conundrum of rhetorically valuing multilingualism, at the same time, delimiting the possibilities and practices  of  multilingualism  (Johnson, 2013).

On paper, the UN prides itself as an inclusive organisation that promotes multilingualism. However, ‘these multilingual policies do not extend into every corner of the organisation’ (Tonkin, 2011, p. 7). Kawashima (2021) revealed an overall average of 53% usage of English at UN General Assembly meetings based on analysis of meeting minutes from 2004 to  2018;  this  is  the  case  even  though  the  UN  has  six  official  languages.  The valorisation of English as an instrumental tool and historical-structural factors (Phillipson, 2018) have led to the dominance of English at the UN. Multilingual organisations, i.e. EU and UN, which lean towards linguistic pluralism, may in fact end up as English- dominant despite well-intended pluralist language policies in these groupings (Ammon, 2012; Kawashima, 2021), partly owing to pragmatism and practicality. As general com- petence towards English grows, the natural choice of using a single operating language is slowly becoming the reality (Ostler, 2010). From the ASEAN narrative, perhaps the choice of English serves its purpose as a regional politico-economic bloc. For ASEAN, efficiency is paramount. ASEAN seems to plan small, leaving much of the LPP work    to its member-states. It may also be seen as cost-effective, as operating in a single language allows ASEAN to save costs on translation and interpretation work.

Economic viability

Most multilingual international organisations and member-governments require some form of language translation and interpretation in their day-to-day management, and in both formal and informal discussions. In this respect, ASEAN’s utilitarian and minimalist approach is debatably a way to circumvent this expensive undertaking. From an economic perspective, ASEAN’s unorthodox approach was hailed as one of the great achievements of ASEAN and perhaps the ‘envy’ of EU (Koh et al., 2009). Historically, Hardini and Grangé (2017) indicated that no interpreter and translator was trained to work when ASEAN was founded in 1967. According to Okudaira (1999), ASEAN Secretariat’s decision is a wise and rational one which helps save on labour costs, trans- lation costs, and capacity building for languages which may not have much relevance   to those outside their country (examples might include Thai, Filipino, Burmese, Lao  or Khmer). Since ASEAN is not as wealthy as the EU, ASEAN may have chosen English as a language of administration, without the need to allocate funds for translation or interpretation (Okudaira, 1999). As mentioned above, the ideology of internationalisation and the use of one ‘neutral’ language characterise ASEAN’s linguistic decision.

For many LPP researchers, the linguistic situation of ASEAN shares many resonances with the EU. Policymakers in ASEAN countries have not only wondered how to replicate the success of the EU, but also how to avoid EU mistakes and failures (Hardini & Grangé, 2017), which can lead to a situation like Brexit (Britain’s Exit from the EU). In this context, the EU seems to have travelled in the opposite direction entirely, choosing instead to provide interpretation and translation in 24 official languages. Substantial human resources, linguistic, financial and logistical resources are  required  to  cope  with the translations and interpretations needed (Grin, 2006; Hall, 2012). Hardini and Grangé (2017) note that the European Parliament and the European Commission  employ about 1500 translators and  interpreters, who constitute one third  of the EU   staff (excluding the elected officials). In 2001, the President of the European Commission reiterated multilingualism was fundamental to the future of EU, but the costs of translation and interpretation should also be taken into consideration (Grin,  2006). These instances expose how controversial and problematic EU LPP is, even as ideal linguistic pluralism continues to be the desired EU goal. Nick (2001, p. 43) attributes this to the ‘astronomical cost of interpretation at conferences and translation of an enormous amount of written materials.’ There is certainly a burgeoning cost of translation, amounting to 1.6 billion Euros in 2006, or an equivalent of 2.30 Euros per European citizen a year (Hall, 2012). The overall budget for translation  and  interpretation is slated to go up with the increase in the number of languages recognised in EU in   recent years.

Should ASEAN follow EU in terms of language policy? Does ASEAN have the ability to implement multilingual policies underpinned by linguistic pluralism? Hypothetically speaking, if ASEAN were to be like the EU, it is predicted that the cost for translation and interpretation alone could be estimated at more than $USD 1 billion, using the cost of translation and interpretation for EU as a yardstick (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). This is  not even remotely practical, given ASEAN’s annual budget is reportedly only a paltry $USD 20 million (Chalermpalanupap, 2016). Even if ASEAN’s own member-states were to foot the bill for translation/interpretation and relay-interpretation was used (Hardini & Grangé, 2017), the overall bill would still be sizeable, especially for some less-developed member-states.

Although the EU linguistic pluralism ideal is important, the realist-minded ASEAN leaders and scholars hesitate at its practicality. ASEAN scholars posit that ‘EU could  only dream of using one official language’ (Koh et al., 2009) and that ‘the EU is an inspiration but not a model’ (Chalermpalanupap, 2009, pp. 132–133). Upon closer analysis, EU is fundamentally a more integrated and relatively homogenous group com- pared to ASEAN, which is inherently an association of member-states (Kirkpatrick, 2010). Even though ASEAN referred to EU when preparing  the  ASEAN  Charter, there had been no shared objective towards building an ASEAN ‘Union’ (Koh et al., 2009). EU is more of a supranational organisation with the existence of the European Commission, European Parliament, and the EU Court of Justice, none of which exists   in ASEAN (Chesterman, 2010). The Bologna Process also facilitated frequent and free movement of students across EU borders mainly for higher education (Huisman et al., 2012) whereas ASEAN’s progress in promoting labour, technological and education exchanges is still in its infancy (Chalermpalanupap, 2016). In view of the distinctive nature of ASEAN and EU, principles  and  underlying  linguistic  ideologies  between the two organisations are expected to differ broadly. Contrary to  popular  belief,  English as the only working language in the ASEAN Charter is viewed favourably. Chalermpalanupap (2009, p. 132), regarded the adoption of English as the sole working language as representing a great advantage which ASEAN has over the  European Union.

04

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to elucidate ASEAN LPP, informed by its underlying principles and the relevant language ideologies that influence language planning discourses. The context of ASEAN necessitates a nuanced interpretation of such ideologies and principles. ASEAN, as this paper shows, has embraced monolingualism, rooted in the ideol- ogy of internationalisation, while both UN and EU strive to achieve plurilingualism albeit through divergent multilingual operational models. Both the choice of ‘everything’ for EU and almost ‘nothing’ for ASEAN respect equity between nations (Hardini & Grangé, 2017), but in glaringly divergent ways. The UN, meanwhile, has chosen the ‘middle ground,’ balancing language ‘ecology’ with ‘efficiency.’ This paper suggests that there is no one-size-fits-all language policy approach, informed by a particular model of language ideology, and that understanding context is key to developing substantive and productive insights into the nature of ‘supra-macro’ LPP. The rationale   for LPP decisions has been found to be grounded in principles such as equality, inclusiv- ity, practicality, instrumentality, economic viability and even, arguably, ‘neutrality’ in the context of ASEAN. International organisations need to deliberate on such principles in relation to LPP. The aim may be to achieve a balance between realism and idealism, weighing up pressures for ideologies of linguistic pluralism and considerations for internationalisation. As our analysis of ASEAN LPP in relation to that of the EU and the UN reveals, ultimately, the LPP decision of international organisations is a fundamental one with potentially far-reaching political, diplomatic, socio-cultural and economic implications beyond the present. Coming back to Nick’s (2001)  insightful  speculations  about language, introduced at the start of this article, language is indeed not simply a tool but a critical resource for determining how different language groups of peoples  can and are able to engage across regional and linguistic borders and boundaries. Determining how this might occur is not straightforward but is important work and must be undertaken with sensitivity and a view to fostering inclusion and diversity, even as enactment may fall short of such ideals.

文章来源

To cite this article: Huan Yik Lee, M. Obaidul Hamid & Ian Hardy (2021): Characterising language policy and planning in international organisations: ASEAN insights, Current Issues in Language Planning, DOI: 10.1080/14664208.2021.1965742

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14664208.2021.1965742

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